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 A study was done to determine the effect of television exposure on the geographic 
distribution of recruits in the Southeastern and Atlantic Coast conferences from 1970 to 
2010. Roster data was compiled for 23 teams, and this data was used to generate 
distances between every recruit’s hometown and the school he would attend. Then, a 
conditional logit estimation was used to determine the effect of distance on a recruit’s 
choice of schools over time. Also included were variables describing each school’s 
academic and football quality and variables describing a recruit’s choice of s h ol by 
where it was located in relation to his hometown. The results showed are clear 
diminishing distance effect over time and also showed preference for recruits to go to 
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 Every Saturday in the fall, it is nearly impossible to turn on the television without 
seeing a college football game or at least a reference to one. Almost every elevision 
network carries at least one game every Saturday, and in some cases, also on Thursday. 
Games are now telecast on the internet, and there are even daily shows about the spor . 
Then, of course, there is the bowl season, in which 30 games ranging in relevance are 
broadcast for millions to see. College football has grown in recent years to become one of 
America’s most popular sports. Thousands flock to stadiums across the country to watch 
their favorite teams play. Several schools routinely have 100,000 people in attendance for 
up to eight home games per year. Between tickets, travel, concessions, and apparel, f ns 
together spend millions of dollars each year supporting their team. Of course, college 
football did not always have such a prominent place on the American sporting landscape. 
Until the 1920’s, college football was little more than a spectacle. After World War II, 
with the introduction of television, college football became a very popular sport, even 
though television rights were strictly controlled by the National Collegiat Athletic 
Association (NCAA). 
 However, after a 1984 Supreme Court decision gave schools and conferences the 
ability to negotiate their own television rights, the sport of college football exploded in 
this country.1 As a result of openly-competitive television contracts, many more games 
were carried on television. All of the sudden, teams could be seen on television from 
week to week. Even if someone could not watch their team’s game that week, they could 
see the highlights on the newly-formed Entertainment and Sports Programming Network 
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(ESPN).2 Every conference negotiated a deal with a television network in which the 
network would pay the conference a certain amount of money for the ability to televise 
that conference’s games. One school, Notre Dame, even negotiated their own contract t  
have every one of their home games nationally televised.  
 However, arguably the industry leader in television contract revenue has been the 
Southeastern Conference. Made up of twelve schools in nine southern states, the SEC has 
been the pacesetter in the market for television revenue. A likely cause of SEC’s strong 
strategic position is the historic football prowess of its teams. Another possible cause is 
that professional sports are relatively new to the South and therefore relatively less 
popular. For whichever reason, the SEC signed a national contract in the 1990’s with 
CBS that was the envy of most of the country. The contract with CBS, which broadcast at 
least one SEC game nationally every Saturday, made the SEC and its member tea s a
national brand. People from California and Texas could watch the Florida Gators and 
Georgia Bulldogs play as much as their home teams. Then, in 2009, the SEC signed the 
richest television contract in college football history with ESPN and CBS, worth $3 
billion over 15 years. The details of the contract are somewhat complicated, but even Mr. 
College Football, Tony Barnhart of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, believes the SEC 
deal far exceeds any television contract available for a college football conference.3 This 
means that each SEC school will receive at least $17 million per year for the nex  15 
years. Additionally, this means that SEC schools will have several games per week on 
national television. 
 For schools, the implications of such large television revenues make it imperative 
to form competitive teams. One way schools compete is by trying to recruit the best 
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athletes to their respective campuses. Recruiting is the process by which high school 
football players decide which college to attend. The process begins early in a player’s 
high school career by receiving mail and telephone calls from interested coaches. Then, 
the player will decide to unofficially or officially visit several campuses (the distinction 
between unofficial and official visits will be discussed later in the paper). Finally, the 
coaches will decide whether to offer a player a scholarship, and the process culminates 
when the players sign letters-of-intent, stating they will attend a certain university. Of 
course, with growth of college football over the last 25 years, recruiting coverage has 
grown significantly as well. Websites, such as Rivals.com, rate and follow recruits for the 
benefit of fans. The time when players sign letters-of-intent has turned into National 
Signing Day, in which ESPN and other networks televise many players’ decisions.  
 With the heightened importance of recruiting, many have tried to gain insight into 
the main factors of a recruit’s decision. This will be analyzed in greater de ail in the next 
section, but two factors that are often discussed are distance and exposure. In this paper, 
distance means the distance in miles from a recruit’s hometown to the school which he 
attends. Typically, recruits, and people in general, seem to have a preference for 
attending colleges close to home. The other factor is exposure, which means recruit
prefer playing for teams which receive media attention, including televised games. There 
are a few possible reasons for this. First, recruits believe that increased television 
exposure may lead to a higher probability of being drafted into the National Football 
League. By attending a school with little media exposure, recruits may feel that NFL 
teams will overlook their talents. The second possibility is that recruits might not value 
the media attention, but rather, they know much more about a school having been able to 
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watch that school’s team play in high school. In other words, recruits care less about the 
media attention they receive and more about what they have learned from being abl  to 
watch a team play.  
If this second reason is true, then the 1984 Supreme Court decision that allowed 
schools and conferences to negotiate their own television contracts should have an effect 
on recruiting. In other words, schools should be able to draw recruits from a wider 
geographic area after 1984 because more recruits will see their respective games. 
However, as previously noted, another of the most important factors in a recruit’s choice
is the distance that school is away from their hometown. For schools to gain from the 
increase they have in television exposure, the distance effect, traditionally strong in 
recruiting, must become less important.  
The purpose of this paper is to determine if increased television exposure could 
moderate the influence of distance in a recruit’s choice of colleges. In order t o this, 
roster data was collected from the SEC and the Atlantic Coast Conference, a conference 
which partially shares the Southern region with the SEC. Historically, the ACC had a 
television contract with ESPN, but most of its games were televised by Jefferson 
Pilot/Raycom, a regional sports network. Like the SEC, the ACC recently signed a deal 
with ESPN for $1.86 billion over 12 years, which includes basketball coverage as well as
football.4 Although the new ACC contract is large, the ACC has received less national 
television exposure than the SEC within the last 25 years. However, both conferences 
have been relatively stable over time: the SEC was formed in 1932 and the ACC was 
formed in 1953.5 Both still have most of their original members. The experiment will be 
to examine the effects of openly-competitive television contracts in these two 
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conferences. The hypothesis is that openly-competitive television contracts have result d 
in schools being able to attract recruits from a wider geographic area due to the increase 
in television exposure after 1985. Of course, the alternative hypothesis is that schools 
have not increased their recruiting base. This would be true if schools recruit the same 
areas over time and the increase in television exposure does not change their recruiting 
areas or recruits’ knowledge of schools. Even though open competition for television 
rights did not begin until 1984, data was included from 1970 to present in order to 
capture any trends present within either conference before and after the chang in 
television exposure.  
There are several implications to this experiment. First, if it is in fact true that 
increased television exposure has allowed any conference to attract recruits from a wider 
geographic area, then it is possible that increased television exposure could threaten th  
competitive balance of the sport, especially given the value of the landmark television 
contract the SEC recently signed. Indeed, it does seem as though the SEC has already 
taken advantage of its increased exposure having won every National Championship 
from 2006 to present. Additionally, given the recent speculation about conferences 
expanding to increase television revenue, it will be curious to see what the consequences 
of expansion are for recruiting. Finally, at the very least, this could shed new light on the 
impact of geography on recruiting.  
The next section will be a review of previous literature. Section III will describe 
the data and methodology used in the experiment. Section IV will test the hypothesis that 
television exposure has diminished the role of distance in recruiting using a conditional 




REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 The sport of college football has been analyzed numerous times in the literature. 
The NCAA is the governing body of college football, and it has come under much 
scrutiny for acting as a cartel. Cartel theory states that often organizatio s form to solve 
some externality problem, and, once formed, find it advantageous to set prices or produce 
an inefficient output to raise profits. According to Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (ee 
Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992), the NCAA was originally started to create rules for 
the safety of college football players, as hundreds died in the early years of the sport. 
Prior to the 1950’s, the NCAA’s main functions were to provide a common set of rules 
for play and keep records. However, consistent with cartel theory, the NCAA found they 
could use this organizational framework to benefit its members. Specifically, they could 
limit the number of games played and the pay to players, creating higher revenues for 
their members. Throughout the 1950’s, the NCAA used their cartel power for this reason. 
For example, in 1949, the NCAA passed the “Sanity Code,” which limited the number of 
scholarships available at each school and created rules for recruiting. These rules for 
recruiting have evolved into what is used today to regulate NCAA schools. In 1952, the 
NCAA granted itself enforcement power over its members. In other words, the 
organization had the ability to punish members who violated the rules of the cartel. The 
enforcement power of the NCAA is a public representation of what every successf l 
cartel maintains privately. The enforcement power of the NCAA started slowly with a 
public warning to Notre Dame and a two year probation penalty to Arizona State, but, 
within the last 30 years, the enforcement power of the NCAA has increased substantially, 
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evidenced by the schedule boycott, or “death penalty”, given to Southern Methodist 
University in 1987-1988.  Other rules set by the NCAA include minimum grade point 
average requirements, regulated television exposure, and the creation of Division 1-AA, 
among others. 
 Historically, the NCAA has been an interesting case to study because it is one of a 
few openly accepted cartels operating in the United States. Of course, cartels are illegal in 
the United States, but the NCAA has so far been subject to lenient antitrust prosecution 
because of several reasons. First, it is the players who are most adversely affected by the 
cartel power of the NCAA. The players, especially high-achieving college football 
players, are given a scholarship that worth much less than their marginal revenue prod ct 
(see Brown). However, these players are not likely to take action against the NCAA 
because they are only eligible for four years and often use college sports to ge  to 
professional sports. Second, the public views the NCAA as standing up for amateur 
athletics, so, in their eyes, the NCAA regulations are essential to keep the idea of
amateurism alive in sports. Finally, the NCAA claims that their regulations are necessary 
in order to promote the competitive balance of the NCAA sports.  
 This final reason can be disputed because, as with any cartel, some regulations 
might benefit certain members at the expense of others. There will be a time when certain 
schools try to use the NCAA to adversely affect the competitive balance of th sport, 
which is called rent seeking. It is the interest group theory that states that when an 
organization has redistributive power, coalitions will form in order to gain these wealth 
transfers. One notable example of the interest group theory in college football ccurred 
when the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia sued the NCAA over the 
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ability to negotiate their own television rights. A coalition of schools joined together for 
their interest even though the majority of schools preferred regulation. Of course, in this 
case, the interest group formed in order to deregulate the industry, a phenomenon that 
similarly occurred in the airline industry with the dissolution of Civil Aeronautics Board.6 
The NCAA case went to the Supreme Court, which decided in 1984 to allow schools and 
conferences to negotiate their own television contracts. 
 Eckard (see Eckard 1998) tests whether the enforcement power of the NCAA 
resulted from rent seeking behavior. Eckard uses various measures to determine the eff ct 
of enforcement power on competitive balance in college football. If competitive balance 
is adversely affected after the introduction of enforcement power, then enforcement 
power exists due to cartel enforcement behavior by the NCAA. If competitive balance is 
enhanced after the introduction of enforcement power, then enforcement power exists for 
the NCAA’s stated reason of creating an equal playing field for its members. Eckard 
starts by stating the goal of a cartel is to stabilize the market shares of the various 
participants. In college football, Eckard assumes market share is measured by won-loss 
record. Therefore, if the cartel view is taken, then teams should have more stable won-
loss records over time. Eckard even goes on to say that competitive balance should have 
naturally increased after World War II because more young men were att nding college 
than in previous years.  
 In his empirical test, Eckard uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure the 
competitive balance of college football. HHI, a commonly used measure of market 
concentration within an industry, is the sum of squared market shares of firms. For 
instance, if two firms each have 50% market share, then the HHI for that industry is 
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5,000. A high HHI means a highly-concentrated or less competitive industry, and a low 
HHI means a more competitive industry. Instead of market shares, Eckard uses final 
Associated Press poll slots to compute the HHI for college football. In ten years of a Top 
10 poll, there are 100 slots to be filled by some number of teams, which is used to 
determine the HHI for college football. In order to test his hypothesis of the enforcement 
power effect on competitive balance, Eckard divides the analysis into years before and 
after 1952. The five years after 1952 are omitted to serve as an adjustment period. From 
1957 to 1984, the HHI increases significantly. Additionally, fewer total teams are 
included in the AP poll after 1952, and there is less entry and reentry into the poll after 
1952. All of these results seem to confirm that the competitive balance of college f otball 
decreased after the advent of the enforcement power, which agrees with the cartel view of 
the NCAA. 
 However, Eckard does make one consideration which is important for this paper. 
The NCAA argued that the advent of television would reward certain schools at the 
expense of others. This would explain the decrease in competitive balance after 1952, 
which is about the same time games started being televised. Therefore, Eckard computes 
the HHI and entry and reentry into AP polls before and after 1984, when open 
competition for television rights began. His results suggest that competitive balance 
actually increased after 1984, meaning that the advent of television could not be used to 
explain the decrease in competitive balance after 1952. Without the presence of television 
as a valid explanation of the decrease in competitive balance in college football, it is clear 
that the enforcement power created in 1952 has decreased the competitive balance of the 
sport and is likely a result of the NCAA cartel behavior.  
10 
 
 In another paper focused on the NCAA as a cartel, Depken and Wilson (see 
Depken and Wilson 2001) look at several institutional changes within the NCAA and 
their effect on the competitive balance of college football. Depken and Wilson begin th ir 
paper by explaining the Structure-Conduct-Performance approach used in industrial 
economics. SCP relates the number of firms in an industry to the conduct (or price) and 
the efficiency (or profits) of that industry. Like the Eckard paper, typical economic 
measures are unrealistic in the production of college football, so the authors develop 
different measures to determine competitive balance. Depken and Wilson also use an 
HHI measure, except their measure converts wins, losses, and ties to a point system, like 
in professional hockey and soccer. A win is 2 points, a tie is 1 point, and a loss is 0 
points. This measure accounts for the changes in the number of games played every year 
and for the number of teams in the industry, both of which have increased over time. To 
measure market concentration and therefore competitive balance, Depken and Wilson 
simply calculate the HHI of points. However, since college football is unlike other 
industries, traditional HHI figures will be different. In response, Depken and Wilson 
calculate an ideal market concentration, which is 10,000/N, where N is the number of 
teams. The ideal HHI represents a perfect competitive balance. Depken and Wilson then 
take the actual HHI for each year and subtract the ideal HHI from it, obtaining the 
difference between the actual and the ideal, which they call the dHHI. The dHHI is the 
dependent variable. The independent variables in their regression are the institutio al 
changes in the NCAA throughout the 20th century. These changes are: the creation of the 
NCAA in 1906, the Sanity Code which limited scholarships in 1949, the previously 
mentioned enforcement power gained in 1952, the adoption of a minimum grade point 
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average in 1965, the creation of Division 1-AA to separate major and minor college 
football schools in 1981, and the creation of the Bowl Championship Series in 1996. The 
data on wins and losses was converted into points for the years 1888-2001. With dHHI as 
the dependent variable, the coefficients on the Sanity Code variable, the enforcement 
power variable, the minimum GPA variable, and the Division 1-AA variable are all 
positive and significant. Therefore, each of these changes increased the market 
concentration of the college football industry and had a negative impact on competitive 
balance. Depken and Wilson, like Eckard, can conclude that the NCAA, through these 
regulations, is engaging in cartel behavior. 
However, Depken and Wilson include a time variable which suggests that while 
these regulations have decreased competitive balance, college football is becoming more 
competitive over time. Depken and Wilson believe this is due to either a reduction in 
information costs in finding and recruiting football talent or a reduction in transportation 
costs allows players to go to schools further away from home. They leave this topic, the 
recruitment of players, open for further investigation. The institutional changes discussed 
in both Eckard and Depken and Wilson created the environment in which recruiting 
currently takes place. There are rules about contacting and paying players. For example, 
schools can only pay for one visit to the campus per player. This visit is called an 
“official visit,” and each player can only take five official visits. Every other visit must be 
funded by the recruit and is called an “unofficial visit.” Additionally, there are extensive 
rules about what is included in a scholarship for a player. As previously mentioned, the 
awarding of scholarships acts to limit the pay of the main input into the production of 
college football. Since the schools cannot pay players their marginal revenue product, 
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they compete by providing in-kind transfers. Athletic dorms, tutors, practice facilities, 
and team clothing all serve as in-kind transfers to allow the best college football 
programs to compete within the framework of the NCAA. The cartel behavior of the 
NCAA created these rules and the system of in-kind transfers, which in turn created 
modern college football recruiting. 
Several papers exist to discuss the economics behind college football recruiting. 
Langelett (see Langelett 2003) discusses the relationship between recruiting and team 
performance in college football. Langelett uses AP polls and team recruiting rankings 
compiled by experts to explore a relationship recruiting and performance. Of course, he 
finds the causation to be bidirectional, meaning good recruiting rankings in one year l ad 
to good AP poll rankings in the next year and vice versa. Interestingly, Langelett finds 
that team performance during a recruit’s junior year of high school has the great st effect 
on the eventual recruiting rankings.  
Another paper (see DuMond et al. 2008) examines all the factors that affect a 
recruit’s decision on which school to attend. The authors describe recruiting as a two-
sided matching problem; the school chooses a player and the player chooses a school. 
They then develop an empirical model that includes all the school-specific and player-
specific information both sides use to make decisions. The authors use a probit model to 
match a recruit to a particular school. This probit model would predict where the players 
would attend based on these factors. Some of these factors are the school’s winning 
percentage, the likelihood of playing time for the recruit, media exposure for the recruit, 
probability of graduating, probability of being drafted into the National Football Le gue, 
and the academic ranking of the school. The authors test three models. The first model 
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includes all the school-specific and player-specific factors. Ranking in the AP poll and 
winning percentage, as shown in Langelett (2003), are seen to be important factors in a 
recruit’s choice. Also, coaching turnover has a negative effect on recruiting, and 
membership in a Bowl Championship Series conference has a positive effect on 
recruiting. The second model adds the unique characteristics between each player and 
each school, mainly the distance between the school and the player’s hometown. As 
expected, distance was an important factor in a recruit’s choice, but the distance effect 
moderates itself after a certain point. Once the recruit lived certain distance away from 
his choices, distance was less important. For example, if a recruit lived in Arizona and 
was choosing between the University of Florida and Florida State University, the 
physical distance between the schools and his hometown was less important. The data 
was from 2002-2004, and in each year, the average distance between player and school 
choice was over 400 miles. Finally, the third model uses only variables which were 
significant in the other models. This third model correctly predicted the college choices 
of 71% of the nation’s best 100 high school football players. Given that each player 
averaged four scholarship offers, randomly guessing would have given the authors a 25% 
chance of accurately picking one player’s choice. Additionally, in several of the mistaken 
predictions, the player simply went to the school closest to home. The distance effect was 
found to be the greatest in the South and least in the West. It is clear from DuMond et al. 
that distance is still a very important factor in a recruit’s choice, even though information 






DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 The data used in this paper was collected from various sports information 
departments and libraries from schools in the Southeastern Conference and the Atlantic 
Coast Conference.7 Specifically, football rosters were obtained from all the schools 
currently in each conference, except the University of Miami, which did not respond to 
requests for data. However, it is believed that the exclusion of Miami will not bias the 
results of this paper. It is well-known that Miami generally recruits the city of Miami 
with few exceptions. Miami would not necessarily show the same geographic changes 
over time as the other schools because it is so close to the area it recruits. Rosters were 
collected from every five years, 1970 to present, from the other 23 schools in the sample. 
Table 1 details the historical membership of each conference, as Georgia Tech, South 
Carolina, Arkansas, Virginia Tech, Florida State, and Boston College were not in their
current conferences for different time periods. The reason to only include every fifth year 
is to avoid having multiple entries of the same player. For example, if a player is a 
freshman in 1970, then, even with a redshirt year, the player’s final season of eligibility 
would be the 1974 season. A redshirt year means the player is allowed to practice with 
team but not play in games. Unless the player receives special permission from the 
NCAA, he cannot appear on the 1975 roster. The only time this is not true in the sample 
is with the final year of the period, 2010. Several schools did not have 2010 rosters 
available at the time of this paper, so 2009 rosters were substituted in place.8 Still, there is 
minimal replication of players because only in the above case of a freshman redshirting in 
2005 is it possible for a player to appear in the 2005 and the 2009 rosters.  
15 
 
 Once these rosters were received, for each team, the year, player name, a d 
hometown were extracted from each roster. For each school, the latitude and longitude 
coordinates for that school’s city were added to the roster data. For example, for every 
Boston College player, the coordinates for Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, were included 
with that player’s hometown and year. Then, the completed roster file was merged with a 
United States Census file which included the latitude and longitude coordinates for every 
city in the United States. The players’ hometowns were matched to the cities in th  
United States Census file, giving each hometown an appropriate set of latitude and 
longitude coordinates. At this point, each player was assigned two sets of coordinates: 
one for their hometown and one for their school town. Using the Great Circle Distance 
formula, one can find distances in miles by using latitude and longitude coordinates, so 
the formula was applied to every player (see Appendix).  A distance was generated for 
every player in sample. International players and players whose hometowns were not 
listed in the United States Census file were excluded from the sample. In total, 1,500 
players had to be excluded, but there were still 17,988 total players in the sample. The 
excluded players had no common characteristics or backgrounds except that they were 
obviously from another country or their hometown was not listed in the United States 
Census file. Finally, the Great Circle Distance formula was used to compute distances 
from players’ hometowns to the other ACC and SEC schools that they did not choose to 
attend. After this calculation, the distance was known from each player’s hometown to 
every school in the ACC and SEC.  
 Once this data was compiled, summary statistics were created to give an idea of 
the trends over time. In Table 2(a), average distance per player for both conferences 
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together can be seen. The striking result from Table 2(a) is that from 1985 to 1990, the 
time for adjustment to openly-competitive television contracts, average distance increases 
by 34 miles. The adjustment period is necessary because television contracts we e not 
immediately created and it took players a few years of watching teams more often on 
television for the effect to take place. This is not a large numerical increase, but one must 
consider that in prior years the average distances were remarkably stagnant. 
 The next calculation looks at the trends over time for each conference separately. 
As Table 2(b) shows, the average distance increases between 1985 and 1990 by about 30 
miles for each conference, like in Table 2(a). There is, however, very little relative 
difference between the average distance for the ACC and SEC, meaning that, in this 
calculation, the SEC teams seem not to use their relative advantage in television xposure 
to draw recruits from a wider geographic area.  
 A third calculation looked at the effect of quality of a football team on average 
distance. This tested the Alchian and Allen theorem, in which the best recruits would go 
to schools further away because they were the high demanders. For this, the ACC and 
SEC teams were grouped into three categories based on final Associated Press poll 
performance: Top 7, Middle 8, and Bottom 8.9 The determination for a team’s placement 
in a category was the total number of AP poll Top 10 and Top 20 finishes from 1965 to 
present. Additional weight was given for a Top 10 finish over a Top 20 finish. These 
particular years were included because it is believed that AP poll finish five years prior to 
the current year has an effect on the current year’s recruiting. Interestingly, the Top 7 
group had the shortest average distance at 224.28 miles. Average distance grew for th  
next two groups to 251.88 for the Middle 8 and 282.64 for the Bottom 8. This result 
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shows that the best teams draw players from relatively closer hometowns than poorer 
teams. One possible explanation is that the best teams are already located closer to the 
best high school football talent.  
 Next, dummy variables were added to denote if a recruit went to a school instate, 
went to school in a border state, or went neither to a school that was instate nor in a 
border state. The names for these dummy variables were instate, border, and import, 
respectively. Table 3 shows the percentage of recruits over the last 40 years that can be 
described as instate players, border players, or import players. The purpose of thi  paper 
is to determine the effect of television exposure on recruiting, so the expected effect is 
that the percentage of instate players would decrease and the percentage of import players 
would increase over time. However, there should be a marked increase after the 
previously mentioned 1984 Supreme Court decision. Allowing for an adjustment period, 
one should expect to see change the instate and import variables in 1990. Looking at the 
table, the effect of openly-competitive television rights appears to be exactly what is 
expected. Prior to 1990, the percentage of instate players is above 53% for every year 
except 1975. For the years 1990 to 2010, the percentage of instate players is never above 
50%. As expected, the import variable is above 22% only once before 1990. For the years 
1990 to 2010, the import variable jumps significantly and is never below 26%. This 
means that the percentage of recruits choosing schools out-of-state that do not share a 
border has increased, relative to instate and border state choices, with the expansion of 
television in college football.  
 Then, the years were separated into three periods: a pre-open television contract 
era (1970-1980), an adjustment period (1985-1990), and a post-open television contract 
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era (1990-2010). The percentages of instate players, border players, and import players 
were again computed, and the results can be found on Table 4. When separated into 
periods, the results are basically the same as before. The instate variable decreases from 
52% to 48%, and the import variable increases from 22% to 29%.  
Finally, the same calculation was done with only the permanent ACC and SEC 
states in order to see any trends present in the schools that have been recruitig in a 
respective conference for the longest period. These states are the ones that have had an 
ACC or SEC school in their state since the beginning of each conference. Therefore, 
Massachusetts and Arkansas were dropped from this calculation. The results can be 
viewed on Table 5. The percentages are similar to when all the schools were includ d; in 
the post-open television contract era, the import variable increases and the instate 
variable decreases. 
In the past, it has been assumed that instate schools have a large advantage with 
recruits, regardless of whether the recruit is physically closer to an out-of-state school. 
However, it seems that television exposure has dissipated this advantage since 1984. Of
course, it would be easy to dismiss the decrease in instate choices as the resul of
television exposure if the recruits were choosing schools which are physically closer but 
across states lines. As is evident here, recruits are choosing schools more often in states 
in which their home states do not share a border. Every set of summary statistics 
developed so far supports the idea that openly-competitive television rights, which has 
resulted in many more televised games since 1984, has influenced the decisions of 






In order to determine the influence of several factors in a recruit’s choice of 
schools, the data was tested using a conditional logit analysis. Conditional logit 
regression is useful in determining which factors affect a decision between sev ral 
choices. It is often used in analyses of why people choose to attend a college or embark 
on a certain career path (see McFadden). The dependent variable is a choice between a 
number of alternatives, and the independent variables are factors that affect the 
probability of choosing one alternative. 
Here, the logit model for determining the factors that affect a recruit’s choice 
includes distance variables, school football quality variables, and school quality 
variables. All three factors are believed to play a role in a recruit’s decision. The 
complete logit model is as follows: 
CHOICE = β1dist_mile + β2dist2 + β3dist_instate + β4dist_border + β5instate + β6border + 
β7midfbqual + β8lowfbqual + β9midfbqual_dist  + β10lowfbqual_dist +β11private +β12aau 
+ β13private_dist + β14aau_dist + ε 
where CHOICE is a dummy variable representing a recruit’s decision to attend on  
school and ε is the error term. 
 The independent variables are all believed to affect the choice of a recruit to 
attend a certain school. Dist_mile is the distance in miles between a recruit’s hometown 
and the school he attends. Dist2 is distance squared. This term shows whether the effect 
of distance is increasing or diminishing. Dist_instate is an interaction term b tween 
distance and a dummy variable for whether the recruit chooses a school in his home state. 
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The reason for this interaction term is to determine if there is any extra dis ance effect for 
a recruit who chooses an instate school. For instance, if dist_instate is positive, then it 
offsets the distance variable, meaning distance is less of a factor for recruits who attend 
instate schools. Dist_border is an interaction term between distance and a dummy 
variable for recruits who choose a school in a border state. Instate is the dummy variable 
for recruits who go to schools instate. Likewise, border is the dummy variable for recruits 
who go to schools in border states.  
 The next set of independent variables is the football quality variables. Midfbqual 
and Lowfbqual are both dummy variables denoting which schools were in the previous 
Middle 8 and Bottom 8, respectively, based on AP poll performance. The Top 7 group 
was left out of the model for collinearity purposes. Additionally, both dummy variables 
were interacted with distance in order to see if membership in a group compounds the 
effect of distance.  
 Finally, there is a set of school quality variables included in the model. Private is 
a dummy variable for whether a school is a privately-funded institution. AAU is a 
dummy variable for whether a school belongs to the Association of American 
Universities.10 Generally, schools that belong to either of these groups are believed to be 
higher ranking academic institutions than others. Once again, these dummy variables are 
interacted with distance in order to see the distance effects present within private and 
AAU schools. 
 In order to accurately estimate the model, several steps had to be taken. First, 
since the distance from the recruit to every school was calculated, every choice not 
chosen by each recruit had to be added. For each player, there were 23 separate 
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observations: 22 for the schools he did not choose and one for the school he did. 
Therefore, the number of observations went from 17,988 to 413,724. Next, it was 
apparent that Massachusetts is an outlier geographically from the rest of the schools, so 
Boston College was dropped from the set. Several specifications of the model were run 
without the University of Arkansas in the model so that every state in the model had an 
ACC or SEC school since the beginning of the conference. However, it was found that 
dropping Arkansas did not affect the results. Finally, to prevent the outliers of the sample 
affecting the estimation, recruits from states without an ACC or SEC school were 
dropped. This was done to prevent a recruit from California or Alaska causing a bias in 
the results. A set of descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6. These descriptive 
statistics include the adjustments to the data mentioned above.  
The regression results for the conditional logit regression can be found in Table 7. 
Column 1 contains the coefficients and standard errors for all years in the sampl 
together. The coefficient on distance is -.00564, which means that the marginal effect of 
another 100 miles between the recruit’s hometown and a school is -.0245.11 This means 
that another 100 miles of distance between a recruit’s hometown and a school decreases 
the probability he will choose that school by about 2.45%. Additionally, the distance 
squared term can be used to figure out if the negative distance effect ever approaches 
zero. In other words, the distance squared term can be used to find out how far away a 
recruit must be for distance to be irrelevant. By taking the derivative of distance plus 
distance squared and setting equal to zero, it is found that distance must be over 12,000 
miles for it to equal zero. Therefore, for this paper, it will be assumed that the dis ance 
effect is always negative.  
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Of course, these effects are informative, but more valuable are their change over 
time. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 7 contain the coefficients and standard errors for a pre-
1985 period and a post-1990 period, representing the introduction of openly-competitive 
television contracts. In the pre-1985 period, the coefficient on distance is -.00910, and its 
marginal effect is -.0395 per 100 miles. In the post-1990 period, however, the coefficient 
on distance is -.00425, and its marginal effect is -.0184 per 100 miles. The difference 
between these marginal effects does not seem like much, but they show that distance 
effect has diminished by about 50% from the pre-1985 period to the post-1990 period. In 
other words, there is about a 50% difference in the effect of distance on a recruit’s choice 
of schools in the two periods. Looking at the other distance coefficients, it is clear that 
distance has a decreasing impact on recruits’ decisions after 1984. This findingsupports 
the hypothesis that openly-competitive television rights have caused an increase in the 
geographic area from which SEC and ACC teams draw recruits. 
Another result is that in all years recruits are simply less likely to attend private 
and AAU schools. The coefficients for the whole period on private and aau are negative 
and significant. Although there is no time trend, it is clear that if a school is private or n 
AAU school, then a recruit is less likely to attend that school. Additionally, the 
coefficients on private_dist and aau_dist are both positive. This serves to offset the 
overall negative distance effect, meaning that these schools are more likely to draw 
recruits from further distances. A possible reason for this is a matching problem between 
schools with higher academic standards. They must find quality football players that meet 
their academic standards, so these schools must draw from a larger area.  
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Finally, the results are surprising when it comes to comparing the instate variables 
to the border variables. First, in the pre-1985 period, the coefficient on instate is 1.95430, 
but it increases to 2.28387 in the post-1990 period. In other words, recruits are more 
likely to choose instate schools after the introduction of openly-competitive television 
contracts. Second, the coefficient on the border state dummy decreases from .86034 in 
the pre-1985 period to .59115 in the post-1990 period. It appears that even though the 
effect of distance has diminished over time, the preference for instate schools has 
increased, and the preference for border schools has decreased. Looking at the interaction 
terms between the instate and border dummy variables and distance, one can see that for 
the instate variable, there is no added effect to distance. For border states, however, the 
coefficient is negative, so the effect of distance is compounded by being in a border state. 
This means that even though being further away makes a school less attractive o a 
recruit, being a border state makes it even less attractive. One conclusion that can be 
reached from these results is that when recruits decide to go to an out-of-state school, 
they are more likely to go to a school in a non-border state. 
To focus on this border effect, a second model was estimated with only the 
instate, border, and distance variables. This time, however, the coefficients were 
estimated by each year rather than in periods. Hopefully, this method will provide more 
explanation behind the effects of border states on recruiting. Once again, all recruits who 
were not from ACC or SEC states were excluded from the model. The results of this 
model can be seen in Table 8. Once again, the coefficients on distance are negativeand 
decreasing, in absolute value terms, over time. This model, unlike the previous model, 
shows a steady decrease in the importance of distance in recruiting. The model suggests 
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that not only has distance become less important since the conferences began negotiating 
their own television contracts, but also that the trend has continued through the 1990’s 
and into the 2000’s. It is evidence that such a trend could continue into the future. Also, 
the coefficient on the instate dummy variable is increasing steadily over time. The 
coefficient for the border state dummy variable, however, decreases dramatically between 
1990 and 1995, which also suggests that television exposure played a role in the sudden 
decrease. This shows a significant decrease in the likelihood of a recruit attending school 
in a border state after the increase in television exposure of schools. Also, over all yea s, 
the coefficient on dist_instate  is either positive or not significant, meaning that being an 
instate school did not compound the distance effect. Once again, the interaction between 
the border state dummy and distance increases the effect of distance in yearswhich the 
















Both models estimated with conditional logit regression have shown conclusively 
that the impact of distance on recruiting decisions has decreased over time. This decrease 
seems to be tied to the expansion of television coverage of college football that began in 
1984 after a Supreme Court decision allowed conferences to negotiate their own 
contracts. Even though the SEC has achieved more exposure since this decision, the 
results of this paper do not confirm that the SEC has attracted recruits from a wider 
geographic area relative to the ACC. An implication of these results is that as conferences 
expand and games are shown in more diverse geographic areas, the absolute value of the 
distance effect is expected to continue to decrease over time. 
One surprising result that could lead to further study is the effect of border states 
on recruiting. It was shown in both models that as years passed, the likelihood of recruits
to play for schools whose states directly border the recruits’ home states decrased. When 
interacted with distance, the effect of being a border state increased the impact of 
distance. In other words, the effect added to the distance effect already present. It is 
unknown why, when distance is becoming less important for recruits over time, the 

































Average distance per recruit over time in miles 
 
Both conferences (a) 
 
Year Average Distance 
1970 205. 990  
1975 229.082  
1980 224.350  
1985 227.910  
1990 261.581  
1995 283.433  
2000 272.525  
2005 282.889  
2009/10 278.121  
N= 17,988 
N=number of observations 
 
 
ACC and SEC separately (b) 
 
ACC Average Distance Year SEC Average Distance 
227.736  1970 188.773 
246.495 1975 215.952 
220.027 1980 227.943 
226.456 1985 229.100 
266.707 1990 257.264 
320.911 1995 255.059 
305.885 2000 247.729 
321.142 2005 251.653 



















Percentages of instate players, border players, and import players over time 
 
Year Instate Border Import 
1970 54.35 24.65 21.00 
1975 49.40 25.65 24.95 
1980 53.00 24.67 22.33 
1985 54.30 23.49 22.21 
1990 48.76 24.08 27.16 
1995 47.71 21.37 30.92 
2000 49.86 21.39 28.75 
2005 48.69 22.78 28.54 









Percentages of instate players, border players, and import players in time periods 
 
Period Instate Border Import 
1970-1980 52.19 25.00 22.81 
1985-1990 51.50 23.79 24.71 























Percentages of instate players, border players, and import players in time periods without 
Arkansas and Massachusetts 
 
Period Instate Border Import 
1970-1980 52.57 24.18 23.25 
1985-1990 52.12 23.38 24.49 









Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Minimum Maximum 
choice 0.045 0.208 0 1 
dist_mile 408.294 222.522 0 1111.164 
dist2 216220.1 211546.6 0 12344686 
dist_instate 10.797 42.63 0 434.897 
dist_border 89.572 150.953 0 916.759 
instate 0.093 0.29 0 1 
border 0.333 0.49 0 1 
topfbqual 0.318 0.465 0 1 
midfbqual 0.318 0.465 0 1 
lowfbqual 0.364 0.481 0 1 
topfbqual_dist 118.69 206.652 0 1070.382 
midfbqual_dist 141.175 249.966 0 1111.164 
lowfbqual_dist 148.43 234.486 0 1005.507 
private 0.182 0.386 0 1 
aau 0.318 0.466 0 1 
private_dist 73.052 178.778 0 925.225 








































































































Estimated using conditional logit model 
N= 315,612 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*   indicates significances at 5% level 
Table 8 
 
Effect of Distance on Player-School Choice by Year 
Independent 
Variables 














































































































Estimated using conditional logit model 
N= 315,612 
Standard errors in parentheses 









The Great Circle Distance formula is Stata code: 
gen lat1_red= homelatitude*((22/7)/180) 
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